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Abstract 
 
The incentives that motivate respondents to reveal their preferences truthfully have 
been a long-standing area of research in the non-market valuation literature. A 
number of studies have been undertaken to investigate incentive compatibility in non-
market valuation. Most of these used laboratory environments rather than field 
surveys (e.g. Carson and Burton, 2008, Harrison, 2007, Lusk and Schroeder, 2004, 
Racevskis and Lupi, 2008). Only a few studies investigating incentive compatibility 
have considered multi-attribute public goods with an explicit provision rule in a 
choice experiment (Carson and Groves, 2007, Collins and Vossler, 2009, Carson and 
Burton, 2008). 
 
The design of a choice modelling study that avoids strategic behaviour has proven 
particularly difficult because of multiple choices and difficulties in developing a 
majority voting provision rule.  
 
This study investigates the impact of the inclusion of a framing statement for 
incentive compatibility in a field survey choice modelling study. An incentive 
compatible statement (provision rule) that sets out to respondents the rule relating to 
when the good under consideration will be provided was employed. The impact of a 
provision rule across three alternative choice modelling multiple choice 
questionnaires was tested by comparing results between split samples with and 
without a provision rule. Four split samples were used to test the impact of a provision 
rule on preferences across different communities including local/rural residents and 
distant/urban residents. A choice modelling analysis that involved a conditional logit 
model and a random parameter model was used to elicit household willingness to pay 
for improvements in environmental quality in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment.  
 
The results of the study show that the inclusion of a provision rule had an effect on 
preferences in the distant/urban communities. However, the impact of a provision rule 
in the local/rural community sub-samples was negligible. This study suggests that the 
impact of a provision rule should be analysed in the context of different community 
characteristics.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Social choice theory concentrates on the analysis of collective decision-making processes 
with the goal of maximising social welfare. Social welfare is a state of human perception 
that is based on community preferences (Georgiou et al., 2000) where the community is 
defined as the aggregation of the individuals who constitute that social grouping. Private 
goods markets work to reveal peoples’ preferences. However, preferences for public 
goods can only indirectly be identified, if at all, through market mechanisms. Therefore, 
in order for such goods to be supplied at the socially optimal level by governments, 
peoples’ preferences need to be estimated using non-market methods. This can involve 
people being asked to reveal their preferences.  
 
Economic theory predicts that individuals will make choices to maximise their own 
utility given their constraints, their knowledge and the possible actions of others. This 
may involve individuals misrepresenting their preferences when asked about their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for public goods. Because of the non-rival and non-exclusive
3 
characteristics of public goods the dominant Nash equilibrium
4 behaviour of individuals 
is to “free ride” (Poe et al., 2002). This means that some people may seek to pay less than 
their WTP for the provision of the good, leading to inefficiency in market provision of a 
public good.  In making stated preference choices, respondents may have a private 
incentive to behave strategically. This means that respondents intentionally reveal a WTP 
amount that is different from their true WTP amount. However, the incentive for strategic 
behaviour could be different from the case of market provision. For example, respondents 
may behave strategically to influence the provision of the good by overstating their WTP.  
 
Free riding occurs in a situation when respondents state a lower value or do not agree to 
pay at all for the provision of public goods in the expectation that others will provide 
enough to cover the cost of provision of this good (Venkatachalam, 2004). According to 
Samuelson (1954) “it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to 
                                                 
3 Individuals receive these goods regardless of their level of contribution and nobody can be excluded from using public goods.  
4 At a Nash equilibrium, expression of preferences of each individual is a best response to the equilibrium strategies of others.    2
 
 
pretend to have less interest in a given collective activity than he really has…” (p 388). 
Evidence from experiments involving real money shows that individuals usually 
contribute 40 to 60 percent of the Pareto optimal level (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
Roberts  (1976) found that the larger the number of consumers of a public good the 
greater is the incentive to free ride due to the smaller contribution made by each 
individual.  
 
Over-stating of WTP may arise in situations when respondents to stated preference 
questions think that they don’t have to actually pay for a good. By expressing the higher 
value they have to influence the decision of the provision of that good. While some 
studies have found evidence of over-statement (e.g. Posavac, 1998, Cummings et al., 
1995, Blamey et al., 1999, Champ et al., 1997). Bohm (1971) in one of the first 
Contingent Valuation (CV) studies of incentive compatibility (IC), used different 
treatments in eliciting WTP to see a preview of a television showed found no evidence of 
free-riding or  over-pledging. 
 
The understatement and overstatement issue was also tested using direct WTP 
questioning and the Smith auction format by Bennett (1987). In the Smith auction 
respondents respond to an iterative sequence of WTP questions. Significant over-
statements were observed under direct questioning whilst under-statements were 
observed in the Smith auctions. Bennett concluded that under-statement was balanced by 
over-statement behaviour (Bennett, 1987).  
 
The misrepresentation of preferences embodied in strategic behaviour can lead to 
inefficiency in the allocation of resources. Therefore there is a need for preference 
revelation techniques to be incentive compatible (IC). Incentive compatibility (IC) in 
non-market valuation concentrates on the incentives that motivate respondents to reveal 
their preferences truthfully which means avoiding potential question misinterpretation 
and strategic behaviours including free riding or over-stating. The design of IC stated 
preference techniques has been a long-standing area of research in the non-market 
valuation literature (Hammond, 1979). Most of the IC studies in the non-market valuation   3
 
 
have used laboratory environments rather than field surveys (e.g. Carson and Burton, 
2008, Harrison, 2007, Lusk and Schroeder, 2004, Racevskis and Lupi, 2008). Only a few 
studies investigating IC have considered multi-attribute public goods with an explicit 
provision rule in a choice experiment (Carson and Groves, 2007, Collins and Vossler, 
2009, Carson and Burton, 2008).  
 
This study investigates the impact of framing for IC in a field survey choice modelling 
study. A key component of IC in dichotomous choice CV questions is the specification of 
a rule relating to when the good under consideration will be provided. In a Choice 
Modelling (CM) application involving multiple choice tasks, using a ‘majority provision 
rule’ is particularly infeasible. Because the single dichotomous (DC) choice format with 
majority provision rule is the only IC format for stated preference (SP) questioning, the 
IC of CM applications with multiple alternatives and multiple choice sets is in doubt. 
Testing the impacts on stated preferences of including a modified form of the majority 
provision rule is therefore the goal of this paper. A split sample approach is used where 
the only difference between the sub-sample treatments is the inclusion of a provision rule. 
 
Natural resource management in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment was used as the 
context for the case study. A CM survey was conducted with respondents from two 
different locations, Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment and Sydney to test for differences in 
responsiveness to a provision rule between local/rural and distant/urban communities.  
 
This paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical basis of IC. 
Section 3 describes the study design and sets out two research hypotheses. Section 4 
details the case study catchment. Section 5 sets out the questionnaire design procedure. 
Section 6 describes the survey logistics. The sample characteristics are set out in Section 
7. Section 8 provides an analysis of the results to test the hypothesis. The last section (9) 
presents some concluding comments.  
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2  Theoretical background of incentive compatibility 
 
2.1 The theoretical foundation 
 
The theoretical foundation of IC lies in neoclassical social choice theory and mechanism 
design theory (Hurwicz, 1986, Groves et al., 1987, Varian, 1992). Analysis of collective 
decision-making processes that maximise social welfare is based on social choice theory 
pioneered by Kenneth Arrow (1951). In social choice theory, Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, or Arrow’s paradox, demonstrates that it is impossible to design a set of non-
dictatorial rules that can convert the preferences of individual members of a group into a 
consistent set of preferences for the group as a whole. Arrow (1951 p.7) indicated that 
“once a machinery for making social choices from individual tastes is established, 
individuals will find it profitable, from a rational point of view, to misrepresent their 
tastes by their actions, either because such misrepresentation is somehow directly 
profitable or, more usually, because some other individual will be made so much better 
off by the first individual’s misrepresentation that he could compensate the first 
individual in such a way that both are better off than if everyone really acted in direct 
accordance with his tastes.”  
 
The Arrow theorem provided a basis to the development of the Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) theorem on the manipulability of voting schemes. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem states that if there are at least three candidates and at least two 
voters, there is no non-dictatorial voting scheme in which the revelation of true 
preferences is the dominant strategy. This is because individuals act strategically to avoid 
wasting their votes on their most preferred candidate if they have a low chance of 
winning. Hence, they vote for their second best option. In such a case IC preferences are 
not revealed, therefore only the single DC choice format is IC.  
 
Mechanism design theory provides a framework for analysing institutions, or “allocation 
mechanisms”, with a focus on the incentives that motivate individuals to reveal or not   5
 
 
reveal their private information about preferred resources allocations (RSAS, 2007). 
Hurwicz (1972) first introduced the IC concept into mechanism design theory. He defined 
a mechanism to be IC if the respondent’s dominant strategy is to reveal truthfully his 
preferences. 
 
Carson and Groves (2007) suggest that people respond truthfully if  the outcome of the 
survey could not affect the respondent in any way. However, the lack of interest in the 
outcome may lead to careless and meaningless responses – the so-called ‘hypothetical 
bias’. Also if respondents are informed that their answers will not be used in the decision, 
they may ignore this information and answer the questions consistently with how they 
think this information may be used because of the effort made in collecting the data 
(Carson and Groves, 2007). Andreoni (1989) explains strategic behaviour from the ‘warm 
glow’ that comes from giving. Also, evidence from experimental economics shows that 
in some circumstances, people do not always behave in a way that maximises their 
economic self-interest (Reeson and Nolles, 2009). For example, in some cases agents 
may have a strategic interest to cooperate voluntarily and tell the truth about their demand 
for public goods (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). McMillan (1979) found that if the gain 
from dynamic cooperative planning is higher than the static gains from free riding then 
people have an incentive to tell the truth. Also Hammond (1979), Bowen (1943) and 
Dorfman (1969) argue that agents have an incentive to reveal their true preferences if the 
costs and benefits of producing a public good is shared equally between agents.  
 
The literature shows that even after 50 years of IC research, the problem of strategic 
behaviour is still an important issue in modern preference reviling techniques such as 
CM. The design of a CM study that avoids strategic behaviour has proven particularly 
difficult because of its multiple choices and the difficulties of developing a majority 
voting provision rule. Therefore, this study investigates the impact of the inclusion of a 
framing statement for IC in a field survey choice modelling study.   
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2.2 Addressing incentive compatibility in non-market valuation  
 
A number of studies have investigated different designs of non-market valuation 
mechanisms to encourage participants to reveal their true preferences. 
Survey design 
While in some cases respondents try to manipulate outcomes in their own interest by 
sending false signals, some of the reasons of IC lie in poor CV survey design (Carson and 
Groves, 2007). Carson and Groves (2007) provide a list of survey design characteristics 
that can improve the IC of the non-market valuation studies. These include: ensuring a 
consequential survey design, transparency of task, credibility of policy, relevance of the 
issue to the respondent, inclusion of  information on how the results will be used, 
plausibility of scenario and that the study and respondents contribution is  perceived to 
have a positive impact.  
 
Carson and Groves (2007) argue that in the case of an inconsequential survey design, 
economic theory makes no predictions about the accuracy of respondents’ stated 
preferences. A consequential design, however, may lead to strategic behaviour.   
Nevertheless, most surveys conducted by government or businesses are consequential. 
Cummings et al. (1997) and  Burton et al. (2007) argue that a hypothetical survey design 
generates unreliable results that are not consistent with economic theory. According to 
Scott (1965) asking a hypothetical question would lead to a hypothetical answer.   
Therefore, the respondents should view their choices as potentially influencing the policy 
decisions (Carson and Groves, 2007). These authors also suggest reminding the 
respondents about their budget constraint which would reduce the incentive to overstate 
their true WTP. The understatement of true values could be reduced by explaining that 
lower values could result in a situation that the good may not be provided.  
 
The transparency of the task is also recognised as an important factor for improving the 
IC of the non-market valuation studies. In general, researchers assume that respondents 
answer the question being asked.  This assumption may be  dubious  if respondents do not 
understand the question (Sudman et al., 1996). The poor design of a stated preference   7
 
 
questionnaire can result in interpretation of the question in a number of different ways. 
Therefore, the clarity and type of language used in questionnaires is very important. 
Moreover, the issue of preference uncertainty can arise if respondents are presented with 
unfamiliar goods. “This can lead to a high variance in WTP estimates or systematically 
biased estimates” (Bateman et al., 2008a p.128). Carson and Groves (2007) agree that 
while familiarity with a good can influence WTP, it does not influence the IC properties 
of the question. Another problem is when respondents are not sensitive to the question 
asked, because critical details are missing or too many details are presented (Fischhoff et 
al., 1993).   
 
The IC of a survey may also be affected by a lack of credibility. The credibility of the 
policy, organisation and researchers involved in the study need to be established in the 
questionnaire. The respondent needs to be provided with true and consistent information.  
 
The scenario presented to respondents needs to be believable. In a situation where too 
high or too low a cost  for the provision of the good is presented, respondents may 
substitute the presented costs with one that they regard as being more realistic (Carson 
and Groves, 2007). Another example of lack of plausibility is when an improvement is 
presented in the questionnaire that does not seem to be fully achievable in the eyes of the 
respondents. They may discount the stated improvement to one that they selected as 
being more realistic (Fischhoff et al., 1993, Bennett et al., 1998, Carson and Mitchell, 
1995, Smith and Osborne, 1996). Carson and Mitchell  (1995) give the example of 
Kahneman and Knetsch’s (1992) study where the description of the goods is argued to be 
inadequate and their provision implausible, making it difficult for respondents to identify 
the relevant scope. Similar criticism was also directed at studies by Smith (1992) and 
Harrison (1992). 
 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) argue that a larger number of people be involved in a CV 
survey to give the impression that their individual preferences would not influence the 
overall outcome. 
   8
 
 
Provision rule 
Attention has been given to the inclusion of an explicit provision rule in the CV non-
market valuation literature. A provision rule provides a connection between survey 
choices and actual outcomes (Hoehn and Randall, 1987). A lack of a provision rule can 
create ambiguity relating to the outcomes of respondents’ choices (Harrison, 2007). This 
is because respondents do not know how their votes are taken into account to decide 
whether the good should be provided.  Moreover, respondents can have different 
perceptions of what the actual provision rule is and, by not knowing how their utilities are 
affected by the outcome of the vote, it could be difficult for respondents to understand 
why they should answer truthfully (Polomé, 2003). If the respondents are not given with 
an explicit provision rule, an assumption may be that the option receiving the greatest 
support would be implemented which is a plurality voting rule (Taylor et al., 2007). This 
may not be the case. Therefore to avoid misguided assumptions, the inclusion of a 
provision rule can add greater certainty to the outcome and credibility to the study.  
 
The most common provision rules used are plurality and majority voting rules (Arrow et 
al., 1993). In plurality voting rule applications, the option that receives the greatest 
number of votes is implemented for the whole group. In the majority voting rule the 
option chosen by more than half of the participants is implemented. Quite often these two 
terms are used interchangeably without a clear distinction between majority and plurality 
provision rules (Lin et al., 2003).  
 
Despite the reduced ambiguity from the inclusion of a provision rule, the IC of the 
selection process of choosing one option from more than two alternatives is affected by 
the strategic behaviour problem specified by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Only the 
application of a provision rule to the two-option choice format or to a voting process 
where there are two wining options out of three could potentially yield an IC outcome. In 
such formats there is no possibility to behave strategically. Moreover voters think that 
their behaviour will have some impact on the outcome, and they know exactly how their 
choices will have an impact on the decision regarding which alternative to implement. 
Therefore, respondents cannot do better than to vote honestly (Harrison, 2007).   9
 
 
 Elicitation format 
As predicted by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, a number of studies have found that 
only the single binary choice elicitation format of CV is a potential IC mechanism. First 
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973 ) showed that a binary decision is a mechanism where a 
dominant strategy is to reveal truthfully people’s preferences (assuming no income 
effects on the demand for public goods) (RSAS, 2007). Following these findings, the 
single binary choice (DC) elicitation format was introduced by Bishop and Heberlein 
(1979) to the CV method and was recommended by the NOAA Panel (Arrow et al., 
1993). In this format, each respondent is asked a single question whether they are willing 
to pay a pre-specified amount for a specific good or not (known as a “take it or leave it” 
offer).  In order to estimate the distribution of WTP the amount of money presented to the 
respondents varies between questionnaires (Boyle et al., 1996). In this format respondents 
cannot do better than express their real preferences. 
 
Despite the IC character of the single binary elicitation format, it has been criticised for 
being  statistically inefficient and prone to starting point bias (Ready et al., 1996). 
To address the inefficiency of the single bounded choice format Hanemann et al., (1991) 
proposed the ‘double-bound’ (DB) elicitation method. However, even though this format 
yields some efficiency gains, the answers to the second question are not IC (McFadden, 
1994, Cameron and Quiggin, 1994, Bateman et al., 2001). This is because answers to the 
second question can be influenced by the first choice (Carson et al., 1994). Moreover, 
respondents may assume that the actual cost could be the weighted average of the two 
prices from both questions (Carson and Groves, 2007). There are other formats: the 
multiple binary choice format that involves a sequence of paired comparisons of the 
status quo and the alternative option, single multiple choice format; and the repeated 
multiple choice elicitation format. Even though these formats are statistically efficient 
they are potentially prone to strategic bias.  
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2.3 Choice Modelling and incentive compatibility 
 
CM is a relatively recently emerged non-market valuation method. The main advantages 
of this method over CV are: the estimation of marginal values of a number of attributes 
and policy options, the facilitation of benefit transfer, the reduction in some of the biases 
(e.g. “yea-saying”) and the possibility of testing for internal consistency (Collins and 
Vossler, 2009). However, CM, unlike the single binary discrete choice format of CV, 
does not have IC properties: the elicitation format of CM in which choices are made over 
more than two alternatives across a series of questions potentially suffers from strategic 
bias.  
 
In CM, respondents are presented with a sequence of choice sets comprising a number of 
alternatives. The CM choice sets usually include three to four alternatives (usually 
including the status quo) described by different levels of attributes including a cost 
attribute. If respondents are presented with more than two options they may choose the 
second best option rather then their most preferred if they expect that their first choice 
does not have a chance of winning.  
 
The other property of CM that reduces IC is the multiple question format. A sequence of 
questions creates uncertainty as to how respondents to the survey treated the information 
across the different grouped alternatives (i.e. independently or not).  In the multiple 
choice format, respondents are presented with different costs for the same good or the 
same cost for different goods at varying points in the questionnaire. The variability of the 
costs between similar options and the variability of the good for the same cost can 
confuse respondents and affect the credibility of the study (Carson and Groves, 2007). 
When respondents are presented with a range of different prices for the same good they 
may assume that the true cost is somewhere in the middle. Respondents may also believe 
that there is no risk of not getting the good. Then they may have a strategic interest to 
always choose the minimum cost option even if their real WTP is higher (Carson and 
Groves, 2007, Bateman et al., 2008b). If there is a risk of not getting the good, the   11
 
 
respondent may first select (from all choices) the best change option at a lower cost and 
reject other options even if they would prefer the alternative change options over the 
status quo in other choice sets. That is, in a multiple choice set format, respondents are 
aware of available combinations of goods and prices on offer. They may therefore look 
for relatively ‘good deals’ compared to other options on offer over the whole 
questionnaire rather than in one choice set (Bateman et al., 2008b).  
 
Some authors argue that multiple response formats are preferable because of repetition 
and learning experience, which are important in obtaining consistent and stable 
preferences (Bateman et al., 2008a). Mitchell and Carson (1989) argued that the indirect 
non-market valuation methods which are based on observing how respondents make 
trade-offs between different resource allocations are less prone to strategic behaviour than 
the methods that directly ask the respondents to state their true preferences. Therefore, the 
CM method, because it indirectly asks respondents about their WTP for different resource 
allocations and due to its choice complexity, is considered by Mitchell and Carson (1989) 
to be more difficult for respondents to develop strategic behaviour than in the open-ended 
CV method. Carson and Groves (2007) argue that through the complexity of CM, with a 
large sample size and careful questionnaire design, strategic behaviour problems in CM 
can be managed. 
 
 
2.4 Testing for incentive compatibility in choice modelling 
 
Some laboratory experiments have tested for IC of CM by investigating different 
elicitation formats and provision rules. However, field testing for IC in CM is largely 
unexplored (Carson and Burton, 2008). 
 
Carson and Burton (2008) conducted a laboratory experiment that investigated the IC of 
different elicitation formats in CM. The study compared alternative questioning formats 
such as a single binary choice, six binary choices, single multiple choice (a single choice   12
 
 
set with more than two alternatives) and repeated multiple choices (more than one choice 
set with more than two alternatives). The study found that the single binary choice format 
is demand revealing. The comparison of the results across these four different elicitation 
formats showed that the proportion of respondents choosing each option in the repeated 
binary choice format was not significantly different from the single binary choice format. 
There were also no differences in the distributions of choices between the single multiple 
choice format and repeated multiple choice treatment. However, the total rate of non-
demand revelation (e.g. status quo bias or the respondent does not choose the utility 
maximising change option) in the repeated single binary choice treatment was 
significantly lower than in the multiple choice treatment. The main problem identified 
with the repeated choice format was an increased rate of status quo bias.  Similarly, 
Racevskis and Lupi (2008) found that while the multiple choice response format 
improved statistical efficiency, the WTP estimates were not consistent with the 
potentially IC single binary choice format.   
 
Explicit provision rules applied to public goods have had limited applications in CM (e.g. 
Carson and Groves 2007). Some studies (e.g. Collins and Vossler, 2009, Scheufele and 
Bennett, 2010) used provision rules in multiple choice formats. For example, a recent CM 
field survey study conducted by Scheufele and Bennett, (2010) employed a single binary 
elicitation format with a majority vote provision rule as the baseline to investigate the 
effects of sequential binary DC elicitation formats. The study presented evidence for 
effects caused by institutional learning and either strategic behaviour or value learning in 
repeated choice questions. However, the study did not find any evidence of strategic 
behaviour caused by sole awareness of presence of multiple choices in a CM 
questionnaire. 
 
Collins and Vossler (2009) in their laboratory CM study found that there was no 
statistically significant difference between the standard DC format questions and the 
three-option trichotomous choice (TC) elicitation format, under the plurality voting rule. 
The authors also used a random selection rule for which the percent in favour of some 
alternative was assumed to be the probability of the implementation of the alternative.   13
 
 
After all votes were collected, one ballot was selected randomly to determine the option 
for implementation. In this treatment, DC and TC were significantly different. 
 
Lusk and Schroeder (2004) tested for IC in CM by comparing hypothetical and real 
treatments using a private good (different quality beef steaks). The result of the study 
showed that respondents to the hypothetical treatment choose the change option more 
frequently. Moreover, the WTP from this treatment for the five rib-eye steaks versus not 
having the steak at all was also higher than from the non-hypothetical setting. However it 
needs to be remembered that the real treatment may have experienced understatement. 
 
3. Hypotheses and study design 
 
In the research reported here, the impact of a provision rule in a three alternative CM 
multi choice questionnaire is explored in the context of an improvement in the 
environmental quality of the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment. Half of the questionnaires 
used for this test included the framing statement: “Only options that are chosen by more 
than 50 precent of the people surveyed will be considered further for implementation by 
the Catchment Management Authority”. This provision rule refers to each choice set in 
the questionnaire. Unlike in previous studies, the outcome are determined based on 
people’s choices and further analysis of the management scenarios, rather than being 
based on random selection from the set of most preferred options. It is argued that the 
inclusion of a statement that provides more information about further consequences of 
peoples’ decisions should make a difference to WTP estimates as it provides a clearer and 
therefore stronger impression of respondents’ contributions to the overall outcome of the 
policy. With additional information about how the outcome of the survey will be used in 
the decision process, comes greater realism of potential actions to take place. This 
consequently should generate different results.  
 
The results from questionnaires with and without a provision rule were compared based 
on responses from the local/rural community (Hawkesbury-Nepean) and a distant/urban   14
 
 
(Sydney) community. To test for the impact of the provision rule on the responses the 
following hypotheses were formulated: 
 
HA: In Sydney and the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples there are no differences 
between attribute parameter (β) estimates obtained from the questionnaires with a 
provision rule (βPR) and without a provision rule ( βNPR). 
 
The null hypothesis:  
 
  HA0:     βNPR  = βPR 
 
 The  alternative  hypothesis: 
 
HA1:     ßNPR
   ≠  ßPR 
 
The null hypothesis (HA0) implies that the ß estimates obtained from the questionnaires 
with and without a provision rule are the same. The alternative hypothesis (HA1) states 
that the ßs differ significantly. Our prior expectation is that the HA1 will not be rejected.  
 
HB: In both Sydney and the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples there are no differences 
between WTP estimates obtained from the questionnaires with a provision rule (WTPPR) 
and without a provision rule (WTPNPR).    
 
The null hypothesis:  
 
  HB0:     WTPNPR= WTPPR  
  
The alternative hypothesis: 
 
HB1:     WTPNPR
 ≠ WTP PR   15
 
 
The null hypothesis (HB0) implies that WTP estimates for improvements in 
environmental quality are the same with (WTPPR) and without (WTPNPR) a provision rule 
in a standard three option CM questionnaire design. The alternative hypothesis (HB1) 
states that the WTPPR and WTPNPR differ significantly. Our prior expectation is that the 
HB1 will not be rejected.  
 
4. Case study  
 
The Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment (see Figure 1) was chosen as a case study for this 
study. The Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment covers 22,000km
2 and 1,000,000 people live 
in this catchment. More than 50 percent of the catchment area is in the National Parks. 
Agriculture occupies about 30 percent with more than half of this agricultural area used 
for grazing.  Native vegetation covers about 70 percent of the catchment area. About 20 
percent is urbanised.  
 
The main environmental issues of the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment include declining 
biodiversity, loss of native vegetation and reduced water quality. The greatest area of 
native vegetation in good quality in the Hawkesbury-Nepean (of the total) area of native 
vegetation in good quality covers 50 percent of the catchment.  
 
  Water quality has declined in 75 percent of the total waterways in the catchment. 
Currently only 15 percent of the waterways in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment are of 
good enough quality for drinking, swimming and fishing. The amount of NS in the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment is 3,000 from which 233 is endangered and vulnerable. 
 
NRM actions such as planting more trees, protecting existing vegetation, fencing and 
revegetating river banks and wetlands, pest and weed control are just some of the actions 
that can improve environmental quality in the catchments. More information about each 
catchment’s characteristics is included in Mazur and Bennett (2009).  
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Figure 1. The Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment. 
 
 
 
 
5. Questionnaire development  
  
The questionnaire was designed to ensure respondents considered it to be consequential. 
Respondents were ensured of the importance of the study and its further use in the policy 
making process. The credibility of the organisation conducting the study was clearly 
displayed. The plausibility of the scenarios and transparency of the task were tested 
during focus group discussions and verified with the specialists in the local area. The 
impact of inclusion of a provision rule was tested using two split samples in each of the 
areas (the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment and Sydney). These two different communities 
were presented with questionnaires with and without a provision rule. Table 1 presents 
the research design.  
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Table 1. Research design and the study sub-samples 
 
     Questionnaires 
Sub-sample location            
With provision rule 
PR   
Without provision rule 
NPR 
Hawkesbury-Nepean Local  /rural  Local  /rural 
Sydney Distant/  urban  Distant/  urban 
 
The attributes and their current and potential future levels used in the questionnaire were 
developed in consultation with local specialists and during focus group discussions (see 
Mazur and Bennett, 2008b).  
 
Three attributes that represent the main potential environmental benefits derived from 
NRM investments in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment were used: area of native 
vegetation in good condition (NV), kilometres of healthy waterways (HW), and number 
of native species (NS). One additional attribute - people working in agriculture (PA) - 
was chosen to capture the social consequences of changes in NRM actions. The fifth 
attribute was a monetary cost. The annual payment to be made by respondents from new 
NRM actions was specified to continue for five years. The payment vehicle was 
described as a mixture of increased taxes, council rates, prices for goods and services and 
recreational charges. Three different levels of each attribute in each questionnaire type 
were determined and used in an experimental design to structure the choice set used in 
the questionnaires. The ranges of the attribute levels are included in Table 2.   
 
Table 2. Attributes and their levels  
 
  Cost  NV  NS  HW  PA 
Condition Now    10500  3000  630  800 
Status Quo  $0  10500  2970  600  7000 
$50 11000  2980  650  7100 
$200 11500 2990  700  7200 
Outcomes in 20 
years time 
$300 12000 3000  750  7300   18
 
 
The levels of each attribute across the predicted range were used in an orthogonal design 
that produced 25 alternative NRM options. These alternatives were randomly blocked 
into five different versions, each with five choice sets. This resulted in ten different 
versions of the questionnaire. Two change options and a status quo option were included 
in each choice set. An example choice set is presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Example of a choice set for the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment 
questionnaire
 
6. Survey Logistics  
 
A drop-off/pick-up approach was used for the survey. Questionnaires were distributed in 
two main towns in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment (Goulburn and Moss Vale) and in 
Sydney. Geographically stratified random sampling was applied to choose the households 
to ensure a representation of the NSW population in terms of gender, age, income etc.
5  
 
 
                                                 
5 A more detailed description about the sampling procedure is included in Mazur and Bennett MAZUR, K. & BENNETT, J. (2009) A 
Choice Modelling Survey of Community Attitudes for Improvements in Environmental Quality in NSW Catchments. EERH Report 
No 10. Canberra, Australian National University..   19
 
 
7. Sample characteristics  
 
The socio-economic characteristics of the sub-samples are presented in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Descriptive statistics: Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment and Sydney sub-samples.  
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Note: income- annual household income ($000), edu – represents respondents with a tertiary degree and above, agr-
represents association with agricultural industry of the respondents and their close family, env-represents association with 
environmental organisations of the respondents and their close family. Sydney S-NPR - the questionnaire without a 
provision rule tested in Sydney, Sydney S-PR - the questionnaire with a provision rule tested in Sydney, HN-NPR - the 
questionnaire without a provision rule tested in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment, HN-PR - the questionnaire with a 
provision rule tested in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment.  
 
A comparison of the socio-economic characteristics of the sub-samples with ABS (2006) 
Census data was undertaken. The 
2 test was used to compare the distribution of age, 
income and education level between the sub-samples against the Census data. There were 
no significant differences in age between the ABS Census data and all the sub-samples 
(Sydney: NPR
2 =8.97, and PR 
2=12.21, Hawkesbury-Nepean: NPR
2 =23.05, and 
PR 
2=22.09). There were also no significant differences in age distribution between the 
sub-samples within each area (Sydney 
2=11.68, Hawkesbury-Nepean 
2 =21.28) and 
the Census.    20
 
 
No significant differences in household size between the samples and the ABS census 
data were found. However, the distribution of educational level was significantly 
different from the Census for all the sub-samples
6 (Sydney: NPR
2 =80.99, and PR 
2=39.24, Hawkesbury-Nepean: NPR
2 =150.92, and PR 
2=195.25).  The proportion of 
people with a tertiary degree was higher in the study sub-samples than recorded by the 
2006 Census. However, there were no significant differences in education level between 
the sub-samples within each area (Sydney 
2=9.59 Hawkesbury-Nepean 
2 =3.44). 
  
The income ranges presented in the questionnaire were consistent with ABS household 
ranges presented in the 2006 Census. Significant differences
7  between the sub-samples 
and Census income were recorded in the Sydney sub-samples (NPR: 
2=22.41 and PR:
2=24.15). Also significant differences from Census were observed for the data from the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-sample with the provision rule (:
2=22.65) but not for the sub-
sample without a provision rule (:
2=18.50). There were no significant differences 
between the sub-samples in each of the sampled area (Sydney 
2=9.59 Hawkesbury-
Nepean 
2 =14.23). 
 
 
8. The econometric  models 
 
Conditional logit (CL) and Random Parameters (RPL) with panel specification models 
were estimated using Limdep (version 4.0) software.
 8  The CL model provides the 
probability of an individual i  choosing alternative j as a function of attributes that 
describe each alternative:  
 
 
                                                 
6 The critical 
2 = 12.59  at 0.05 level d.f. 6 
7 The critical 
2 = 21.06  at 0.05 level d.f. 12 
8 Random Parameters model without panel specification was also conducted. As no significant 
improvement in model fit and no significant differences in WTP in comparison to the CL model were 
identified the results of this model were not recorded in the following paper.    21
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where xij  is a vector of attributes j  and individual characteristics i,  β is a vector of 
parameters, j and q are the vectors of attributes describing different options,  and μ is a 
scale parameter, which is usually normalized to one. Due to the fact that the scale factor μ 
and parameter vector β are confounded in the MNL model it is difficult to observe 
differences in the estimated parameters and scale factors. In order to compare β 
parameters across the two data sets (with and without a provision rule) the scale factor μ 
needs to be isolated. The scale parameter is inversely proportional to the standard 
deviation of the error distribution V(eij)= π
2/6σ
2
 where σ is the standard deviation of error 
distribution (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). In order to be able to compare the 
parameters between two data sets the Swait and Louviere (1993) test is conducted. This 
test involves two stages. The first stage tests the null hypothesis that the parameters are 
equal while permitting the scale factors to vary between the data sets.  
 
HA1: βNPR = βPR= β 
 
This test uses the likelihood ratio (LR) test:  
 
LR = -2[LLpooled - (LLNPR  + LLPR)          (2) 
 
where LLNPR and LLPR are the log-likelihoods corresponding to each model. LLpooled is 
the log-likelihood value of the combined data set of NPR and PR. The scale parameter for 
one of these data sets should be rescaled (in this case NPR). The correct value of the 
relative scale parameter is found by conducting a grid search using different values of the 
scale parameter. The scale parameter for which the log-likelihood of the pooled model 
(PR+NPR) is optimised is chosen. The test statistic is χ
2 distributed with (K+1) degrees 
of freedom, where K is the number of common parameters in each of the models (pooled, 
NPR and PR) and the additional degree of freedom occurs because μ varies under the   22
 
 
alternative hypothesis (Swait and Louviere, 1993). If the first hypothesis cannot be 
rejected the second stage of the test needs to be conducted. This involves a test of the null 
hypothesis of equal scale factors. 
 
HA2: μNPR  = μPR = μ 
 
The test statistic is:  
 
 LR = -2*(LL - LLpooled)            ( 3 )  
 
Where LL is the log likelihood value for the model using the combined data set in which 
the scale factors of the two sub-samples are assumed to be equal, and LLpooled  is as 
previously defined. The test statistic is χ
2 distributed with one degree of freedom.  Only if 
both hypothesis HA1 and HA2 are not rejected at a given confidence level can we retain 
the hypothesis that: 
 
HA3: βNPR = βPR  and   μNPR = μPR 
 
If only HA1 is not rejected μPR can be interpreted as a measure of the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of the error variance of the two data sets (Swait and Louviere, 1993). “If 
HA1 is rejected the estimated value is simply an average multiplier that optimally scales 
the data of sample PR to offset the imposition of the β parameter equality assumption” 
(Swait and Louviere, 1993 p 309).  
 
The standard assumption of the CL model is that the ε term is an independently and 
identically distributed (IID) Gumbel random variable (McFadden, 1974). The irrelevance 
of independent alternatives (IIA) assumption is derived from the IID. According to the 
IIA assumption, the inclusion of an irrelevant alternative in a choice set has no impact on 
the probability of the selection of a particular alternative by the respondent. This 
assumption can be violated and in such cases a different assumption regarding the   23
 
 
stochastic term needs to be made, necessitating the use of alternative models including 
random parameter logit (RPL). 
 
RPL accounts for observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity across respondents 
and relaxes the IIA “despite the presence of the IID assumption for the random 
components  εij of the alternatives” (Louviere et al., 2000). This means that the RPL 
model separates IIA from IID and allows cross-correlation amongst alternatives in the 
estimated models (Hensher and Reyes, 2000). The form of RPL is described below 
drawing from (Train, 1998) and Greene (2007). 
 
A specification for the RPL model is the same as for the conditional logit model (see 
equation 1, this time including αij and multiple choice situation t) except that coefficient βi 
varies in the population.  
 
() () i jit
ijt J
q=1 q qit
exp  x
L=
exp(  x )
ij
iq
αβ
β
αβ
+
+ ∑
                  ( 4 )  
 
The variance in βi induces correlation in utility. Therefore the coefficient vector βi of each 
respondent i can be expressed as: 
ji   =  + β βσ ν                          (5) 
 
Where βi is the population mean β, νi is the individual specific heterogeneity, with mean 
zero and standard deviation one.  σ  is the standard deviation of βi around the mean β 
(Greene, 2007). σ  accommodates the presence of unobservable preference heterogeneity 
in the sampled pollution  (Hensher et al., 2005) . 
 
 In the RPL model it is assumed that individual preferences βi vary across the population 
with density f ( / )  β θ where θ  are the parameters of this distribution (representing the 
mean and standard deviation of preferences) (Train, 1998). Hence, the probability that the 
individual i chooses the alternative j can be expressed as the integral of the conditional   24
 
 
probability (equation 6) over all possible values of β weighted by the density of β (Train, 
1998).  
 
() () ijt P = f ( / ) d ijt L θβ β θ β ∫        ( 6 )    
   
In the RPL model, choice probability cannot be calculated exactly. Instead, the 
probability is approximated through simulation. “For a given value of the parameter θ a 
value of β is drawn from its distribution” (Train, 1998 p.5).  
 
In CM, respondents are usually presented with a sequence of choices. However, standard 
CL and RPL models treat each choice set as a separate observation and do not account for 
error correlation between choices made by one individual. The panel specification of RPL 
model calculates the conditional probability at the level of each individual respondent by 
accounting for error correlations between repeated choices of each individual. Therefore, 
the assumption that the choices made by the same respondent are independent no longer 
holds.  Therefore the log likelihood becomes: 
 
 
( ) () f  (/)  d ijt ijt
t
LL L β ββ θ β =∫ ∏           ( 7 )  
 
9. Results 
 
In total, 1121 responses producing 56,055 choice observations were collected from the 
four sub-samples. In about 32 percent of the choice sets, the status quo option was 
chosen. In both the Sydney sub-samples (with and without a provision rule) 35 percent of 
choices were the status quo option. In the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples the status 
quo option was chosen in 30 percent of choice stets in the questionnaires with a provision 
rule and in 26 percent of choice sets in the questionnaires without a provision rule. There 
is however no significant difference (at the 5 percent level) between the sub-samples in 
this regard.    25
 
 
The CL model used in this choice modelling analysis was estimated using Limdep 
(version 4.0) software. The equations for this model are: 
 
12 3 4 5 U(A)= costs+ NV+ NS+ HW+ PA β ββββ  
12 3 4 5 U(B)=ASC+ costs+ NV+ NS+ HW+ PA+ASC*AGE+ASC*EDU+
ASC*INC+ASC*GEN+ASC*CHIL+ASC*ENV+ASC*AGR
β ββ ββ    (8)    
12 3 4 5 U(C)=ASC+ costs+ NV+ NS+ HW+ PA+ASC*AGE+ASC*EDU+
ASC*INC+ASC*GEN+ASC*CHIL+ASC*ENV+ASC*AGR
β ββββ
 
            
where:  
A - Status quo option 
B and C - change options 
β - estimated coefficients 
ASC - alternative specific constant 
 
The attributes are described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Variables used in the Choice Models  
ASC  alternative specific constant 
NV km
2 of native vegetation in good condition 
NS    number of native species 
HW  km of healthy waterways 
PA  number of people working in agriculture 
COST  cost of choice alternative ($ pa per household over 5 years) 
ASCAGE  respondent age x ASC 
ASCEDU  respondent  education status (1=with tertiary degree) x ASC 
ASCINCOME  respondent household income ($000) x ASC 
ASCGENDER  respondent gender (1= female) x ASC 
ASCCHILDERN  respondent children (1= with children) x ASC 
ASCENV  respondent association with environmental organisation (1=associated) x ASC 
ASCAGR  respondent association with agricultural industry (1=associated) x ASC 
   26
 
 
The status quo level was treated as the constant base for each attribute. Therefore, the 
differences in choice probabilities between the status quo and a specific option with 
different attribute levels were expressed in the estimated model parameters. All 
parameters used in the models are generic. In order to account for preference 
heterogeneity, models with socio-economic and attitudinal variables were estimated. 
Socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, income, gender, number of 
children, association with agricultural industry and association with environmental 
organisation were included in the CL by interacting them with the ASC.  
 
A Hausman test was conducted in order to test for any violation of the IIA. This test 
showed that there was no breach of the IIA assumption (at the 5% significance level) in 
all of the CL models.  However to account for observed and unobserved preference 
heterogeneity RPL models were estimated.  
 
In order to estimate the RPL model, simulations were undertaken to determine the 
appropriate distributions for the random variables. Normal distributions were used for the 
final models. The cost attribute coefficient was treated as a fixed parameter whilst other 
coefficients were allowed to vary. Estimates for the RPL models were derived using 500 
Halton draws (Train, 2000). The attributes that consistently showed an insignificant 
standard deviation were treated as non-random and the model was re-estimated. The best 
model in terms of model fit and significance of the attributes was chosen. 
 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across the choices from the same 
individual, a model with panel specifications was used. The results from the choice 
models for each sample are presented in Tables 4 to 7. The results indicate a good overall 
model performance. A better model fit (higher pseudo-R
2) was obtained in the RPL by 
accounting for error correlations between repeated choices of each individual. The 
pseudo R
2 for most of the CL models was around the ten percent level but for RPL was 
twenty percent.  
   27
 
 
The ASC (coded as 1 for the change options) was negative and significant for all the 
models. The results show that for all the split samples, the signs of the model parameters 
are in accordance with a priori expectations. All the significant environmental attribute 
parameter coefficients have positive values implying that those NRM scenarios which 
result in higher levels of any single attribute are preferred. The cost coefficient was 
negative and significant for all the models. The significance of the attributes varied 
between different community types and models.  
 
The significance of the attributes obtained from the RPL models were the same as 
obtained from the CL models in most of the sub-samples. In both Hawkesbury-Nepean 
sub-samples (NPR and PR) the NS, HW and PA attributes were significant at the ten 
percent level and NV was insignificant. NS attribute even significant in the CL model for 
PR sub-sample it become insignificant in the RPL model. In both Sydney sub-samples 
(NPR and PR) HW and NS were significant, NV was only significant in the NPR sub-
sample and PA was insignificant in both sub-samples.  Similarly for the Hawkesbury-
Nepean PR sub-sample the NS attribute become insignificant in the RPL model.  
 
The respondents with a higher education level were more likely to choose the change 
option in all the sub-samples. Income also had a positive and significant effect on 
peoples’ choices but only in the sub-samples without a provision rule.  Also people from 
Sydney who were associated with an environmental organisation were more likely to 
choose the change options in both sub-samples (PR and NPR).     
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Table 4. Choice models without provision rule (NPR):  Sydney sub-sample 
 CL  RPL 
Random parameters   
HW   .0071*** (.0020) 
Random parameter standard deviations 
HW   .0162*** (.0016) 
    
ASC  -3.955*** (.7050)    -3.9550*** (.9024) 
COST  -.0052*** (.0005)    -.0081*** (.0008) 
NV   .0003*** (.0001)    .0017*** (.0002) 
NS   .0269*** (.0067)    .0272*** (.0075) 
HW   .0057*** (.0013)     
PA  .0009 (.0007)    .0020** (.0009) 
ASCAGE   .0189*** (.0061)    .0195** (.0067) 
ASCEDU  .0777* (.0418)    .0779 (.0516) 
ASCNCOME  .0119*** (.0018)    .7811D-05*** (.2061D-05) 
ASCGENDER  .5283*** (.1701)    .5283** (.1997) 
ASCCHILDREN  -.1987 (.1990)    -.1987 (.2322) 
ASCENV  .5477*** (.2320)    .5477** (.2568) 
ASCAGR  .4834** (.2529)    .4834 (.3208) 
AIC 1.95713  1.76165 
BIC 1.95761  1.83777 
HQIC 1.98416  1.79076 
Pseudo R2  0.12079  .2127340 
D.F.O 13  14 
Log likelihood
  -847.1601    -760.2472 
Chi
2 232.78460  41.8660 
Observations 879  879 
Notes: Significance levels indicated by: * 0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, standard errors in brackets . 
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Table 5. Choice  models with provision rule (PR): Sydney sub-sample 
 CL  RPL 
Random parameters   
NS   -.0239  (.0150) 
Random parameter standard deviations   
NS   .1440  (.0148) 
Non-random parameters   
ASC    -1.9670*** (.5689)    -2.1681* (1.188) 
COST  -.0055*** (.0005)    -.0082*** (.0007) 
NV   .9464D-04 (.0001)    .0002 (.0002) 
NS   .0124* (.0067)     
HW   .0038*** ( .0013)  .0048*** (.0016) 
PA  .0003 (.0007)    .0006 (.0008) 
ASCAGE   .0168*** (.0058)    .0320** (.0134) 
ASCEDU  .1134*** (.0318)    .1704** (.0760) 
ASCINCOME  -.0013 (.0015)    .2192D-06 (.3339D-05) 
ASCGENDER  .0814 (.1501)    .1669 (.3351) 
ASCCHILDREN  -.2582 (.1720)    -.4746 (.3873) 
ASCENV  .5484*** (.2183)    .4643 (.4545) 
ASCAGR  .0726 (.2279)    -.4647 (.5003) 
AIC 2.05123  1.71307 
BIC 1.12255  1.78987 
HQIC 2.07852  1.74246 
Pseudo R2  0.0762  .2350127 
D.F.O 13  14 
Log likelihood
  -878.2585    -730.3288 
Chi
2 144.8780  448.7305 
Observations 869  869 
Notes: Significance levels indicated by: * 0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, standard errors in brackets 
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Table 6. Choice models without provision rule (NPR): Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-
sample 
  CL RPL 
Random parameters  
NS   .0093  (.0149) 
Random parameter standard deviations 
NS   .1592***  (.0151) 
Non-random parameters   
ASC  -3.8937*** (.6445)    -6.0505*** (1.4503) 
COST  -.0047*** (.0005)    -.0077*** (.0007) 
NV   .0001 (.0001)    .0002 (.0001) 
NS   .0325*** (.0061)     
HW   .0042*** (.0012)    .0051*** (.0015) 
PA  .0011* (.0006)    .0020*** (.0007) 
ASCAGE   .0223*** (.0049)    .0468*** (.0121) 
ASCEDU  .1257*** (.0368)    .2446*** (.0851) 
ASCINCOME     .0085***  (.0023)    .1272D-04*** (.5027D-05) 
ASCGENDER  .5930*** (.1508)    1.2081*** (.3646) 
ASCCHILDREN  -.2922 (.2016)    -.4751 (.4817) 
ASCENV  .3475 (.2174)    -.6295 (.5039) 
ASCAGR  -.0238 (.2077)    .8301* (.5039) 
AIC 2.01965  1.63562 
BIC 2.08325  1.70411 
HQIC 2.04382  1.66164 
Pseudo R2  0.08862  .2682919 
D.F.O 13  14 
Log likelihood
  -1000.866    -807.0790 
Chi
2 194.6540  591.8555 
Observations 1004  1004 
Notes: Significance levels indicated by: * 0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, standard errors in brackets 
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           Table 7. Choice models with provision rule (PR): Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-sample 
  CL RPL 
Random parameters   
NS   .0260*  (.0147) 
Random parameter standard deviations 
NS    .1632*** (.0168) 
Non-random parameters 
ASC  -1.5332** (.6733)    -.7948 (1.4519) 
COST  -.0058*** (.0005)    -.0089*** (.0007) 
NV   .0001 (.0001)    .0002 (.0002) 
NS   .0337*** (.0064)     
HW   .0046*** (.0012)    .0064*** (.0015) 
PA  .0011* (.0006)    .0020*** (.0008) 
ASCAGE   .0002 (.0055)    .0116 (.0125) 
ASCEDU  .1030*** (.0373)    .1345 (.0859) 
ASCINCOME  .0014 (.0020)    .3579D-05 (.4666D-05) 
ASCGENDER  .3127** (.1642)    .3683 (.3819) 
ASCCHILDREN  -.3232  (.2457)    -.9180 (.5781) 
ASCENV  .2682  (.2719)    -.5640 (.5900) 
ASCAGR  -.1447  (.1929)    .1103 (.4537) 
AIC  1.99819  1.693929 
BIC  2.06527  1.71152 
HQIC  2.02377  1.66682 
Pseudo R2  0.0886  .2675001 
D.F.O  13  14 
Log likelihood
 
-925.1525    -755.6446 
Chi
2  178.7100  551.9046 
Observations  939    939 
Notes: Significance levels indicated by: * 0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, standard errors in brack  32
 
 
8.2 The implicit prices  
 
The WTPs for changes in each attribute were estimated as implicit prices (IP). The 
marginal value of a change in a single attribute was calculated by dividing the β 
coefficients of the attributes (NV, NS, HW, and PA) by the β coefficient of the cost 
parameter and multiplying by -1.  
 
attribute
cost
IP=-1
β
β
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
                           (9) 
 
 
The 95 precent confidence intervals (CI) for the WTPs were obtained by using a 
bootstrapping  procedure from the unconditional parameter estimates (Krinsky and Robb, 
1986).  A vector of 1000 sets of parameters was drawn for each attribute from the 
covariance matrix for each sub-sample. The WTP estimates obtained from CL and RPL 
models are presented in Table 8. 
 
The results show that the IPs for the environmental attributes are positive implying that 
respondents have positive WTPs for improvements in environmental quality. The IPs for 
environmental improvements in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment obtained from the 
questionnaires with and without a provision rule from both Sydney and the Hawkesbury-
Nepean sub-samples are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8. The mean annual households WTP (for 5 years) 
 
 
CL 
  Sydney  HN 
Attributes NPR  PR  NPR  PR 
NV 
 
$0.06** 
(0.01 ~ 0.11) 
$0.02 
(-0.03 ~ 0.06) 
$0.03 
(-0.02 ~ 0.08) 
$0.02 
(-0.02 ~ 0.06) 
NS 
 
$5.25*** 
(2.61 ~ 7.90) 
$2.30* 
(-0.13 ~ 4.56) 
$6.97*** 
(4.21 ~ 9.74) 
$5.89*** 
(3.69 ~ 6.15) 
HW 
 
$1.10*** 
(0.56 ~ 1.64) 
$0.70*** 
(0.24 ~ 1.20) 
$0.90*** 
(0.37 ~ 1.42) 
$0.79*** 
(0.39 ~ 1.24) 
PA 
 
$0.17 
(-0.08 ~ 0.42) 
$0.06 
(-0.19 ~ 0.30) 
$0.23* 
(-0.02 ~ 0.48) 
$0.20* 
(-0.01 ~ 0.41) 
RPL 
NV 
 
$0.21*** 
(0.18 ~ 0.25) 
$0.03 
(-0.01 ~ 0.06) 
$0.02 
(-0.01 ~ 0.06) 
$0.02 
(-0.02 ~ 0.05) 
NS 
 
$3.31*** 
(1.54 ~ 5.04) 
$-2.94 
(-6.80 ~ 0.49) 
$1.18*** 
(-2.65 ~ 4.88) 
$2.91 
(0.24 ~ 6.01) 
HW 
 
$0.87*** 
(0.41 ~ 1.37) 
$0.58*** 
(0.20 ~ 0.97) 
$0.66*** 
(0.27 ~ 1.05) 
$0.72*** 
(0.37 ~ 1.08) 
PA 
 
$0.24** 
(0.02 ~ 0.46) 
$0.07 
(-0.12 ~ 0.26) 
$0.25** 
(0.05 ~ 0.45) 
$0.22** 
(0.04 ~ 0.39) 
 
 
 
8.3 Hypothesis testing 
 
HA: In Sydney and the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples there are no differences 
between attribute parameter (β) estimates obtained from the questionnaires with a 
provision rule (βPR) and without a provision rule ( βNPR). 
 
To compare the models from two different sub-samples the coefficient vectors of these 
models need to contain the same elements. In order to identify the best RPL model, the 
model specification in terms of the type and number of random parameters is varied   34
 
 
between the sub-samples.
9 Therefore, to be able to test for equivalence of the preferences 
across the two data sets CL models that have the same specification were used. To test 
the null hypothesis of equivalence of the preferences across the two data sets (with and 
without a provision rule) a grid search was conducted to estimate the ratio of scale 
parameters (Swait and Louviere, 1993) where μNPR for the data set without a provision 
rule was constrained to one and μPR for the data with a provision rule become the relative 
scale factor.  
 
Following  Swait and Louviere,  (1993) the following steps were undertaken. First the log 
likelihood values (LLNPR and LLPR) for two separate models PR and NPR were estimated. 
Second, the log likelihood value (LLpooled) was estimated for the pooled model data 
(PR+NPR). In the pooled model data sets PR and NPR were assumed to be independent. 
The third step involved combining the two data sets but rescaling one of the data sets 
(NPR) by conducting a grid search to identify the scale factor that maximises the log-
likelihood of the pooled model (Earnhart, 2002). The results of the pooled models are 
presented in Table 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The consistent RPL models in terms of number and type of random parameters between sub-samples were 
determined but the standard deviation of some of the random parameters were insignificant and the models 
were not superior the CL model.    35
 
 
Table 9.  Pooled model results (CL) 
 
  Pooled – Sydney 
(no scaling) 
Pooled – Sydney 
( with scaling) 
Pooled – HN 
(no scaling) 
Pooled – HN 
(with scaling) 
ASC  -2.7997***  (.4293) -2.7566***(.4244) -2.8182***(.4593) -2.8109***(.4312) 
COST  -.0053***(.0004) -.0052***(.0004) -.0052***(.0004) -.0055***(.0004) 
NV  .0002**(.9214D-04) .0002**(.9101D-04) .0001(.8515D-04)  .0001(.892D-04) 
NS  .0193***(.0047) .0191***(.0046) .0328***(.0044) .0346***(.0046) 
HW  .0048***(.0009) .0047***(.0009) .0043***(.0008) .0046***(.0009) 
PA  .0006(.0005) .0006(.0005)  .0011***(.0004) .0012***(.0005) 
ASCAGE  .0162***(.0040) .0162***(.0040) .0149***(.0040) .01482***(.0040) 
ASCEDU  .0959***(.0246) .0916***(.0241) .1133***(.0260) .1204***(.0263) 
ASCINCOME  .0046***(.0011) .0046***(.0017) .0049***(.0015) .0049***(0015) 
ASCGENDER  .2200**(.1095) .2162**(.1082)  .4729***(.1098) .5091***(.1160) 
ASCCHILDREN  -.2324*(.1273) -.2305*(.1260) -.2615*(.1532) -.2949*(.1604) 
ASCENV  .5314***(.1562) .5253***(.1544)  .2987*(.1652) .3412**(.1758) 
ASCAGR  .2681*(.1670) .2678*(.1651) -.0475 (.1391)  -.0691(.1459) 
Pseudo R2  .08677 .08683 .08439 .08569 
Log likelihood  -1748. 578  -1748. 461  -1936. 484  -1933. 548 
D.F.O  13 13 13 13 
Chi
2(critical Chi
2 in 
brackets)
  332.262(19.675) 332.496(19.675) 356.944(19.675) 362.416(19.675) 
Observations  1748 1748 1943 1943 
Notes: Significance levels indicated by: * 0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
The log-likelihood ratio test was then conducted to test for similarities between the two 
data sets (NPR and PR) for the local/rural (Hawkesbury-Nepean) and distant/urban 
(Sydney) community sub-samples. The results of these tests are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Test results for simulated data for the local/rural (Hawkesbury-Nepean) and 
distant/urban (Sydney) communities sub-samples. 
 
Sub-
sample 
μ 
 
LHN  LHI  LLpooled  λH1 
Reject 
HA1 
LL  λH2 
Reject 
HA2 
Sydney  1.024 -847.16 -878.26  -1748.46  46.08  YES  -  -  - 
Hawkesbury
-Nepean 
0.904 -1000.87 -925.15 -1933.55 15.06 NO  -1936.48  5.87 YES 
HA1: Chi-squared statistic for 14 d.f. and 95% confidence level = 23.68479  
HA2: Chi-squared statistic for 1 d.f. and 95% confidence level = 3.84146 
 
For the Sydney sub-samples the null hypothesis of equal parameters (HA1) is rejected at 
the 95% confidence level.  For the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples the HA1 hypothesis 
could not be rejected at the 95% confidence level. However, the rejection of HA2 for the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples implies that the scale factor and the error variance of 
the two sub-samples are different at the 95% confidence level. Thus, we can conclude 
that the inclusion of a provision rule in the CM questionnaire had an effect on the 
preference parameters for the Sydney sub-samples but it only had an effect on the scale 
parameters for the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples. Therefore, at the 5 percent level of 
significance we cannot reject the hypothesis (HA0) of equal parameters between the sub-
samples with a provision rule (PR) and without (NPR) for both locations (Sydney and 
Hawkesbury-Nepean).  
 
HB: In both Sydney and the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples there are no differences 
between WTP estimates obtained from the questionnaires with a provision rule (WTPPR) 
and without a provision rule (WTPNPR).    
 
In order to perform the IC hypotheses tests it is necessary to identify whether the 
differences between the estimated IPs of the attributes across the different sub-samples 
are statistically significant. The Poe et al. (1994) test was used to compare IPs between 
different sub-samples. The Krinsky and Robb (1981) bootstrapping procedure was used 
to simulate the distribution of each WTP by using 1000 random draws. Using these 
random draws, the distributions of WTP differences between model pairs were compared.   37
 
 
This process was repeated 100 times for each pair of WTP estimates in order to generate 
the average proportion of differences where the differences are greater than zero. 
 
The results of the Poe et al. (1994) test show that there are no significant differences in 
WTP between the values obtained from the CL and RPL models for most of the 
attributes
10. Only two significant differences in WTP for NS in the Hawkesbury-Nepean 
NPR sub-sample and in the Sydney PR sub-sample were identified.  As the RPL model 
specifications are different between the sub-samples the CL model that has the same 
specification across sub-samples is more suitable for the comparisons of the WTP 
estimates. Therefore, due to the similarity of outcomes in the IC test for both models and 
for clarity and consistency only the Poe et al. (1994) test for the CL models are discussed.  
 
The WTP estimates obtained from the questionnaires with the provision rule (PR) are 
consistently greater than the marginal WTP estimates obtained from the questionnaires 
without a provision rule (NPR) in both Sydney and the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples 
(see Table 8). The Poe et al. (1994) test however, showed that there are no significant 
differences (at the 10 percent level) between values from the two different treatments (PR 
and NPR) in the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples.  
 
In the Sydney sub-sample the values obtained from the questionnaires without a 
provision rule were significantly higher (at the 10 percent level) for NS. No significant 
differences were observed for the NV, HW and PA attributes between the two Sydney 
sub-samples (PR and NPR). 
11 Therefore, HB0 cannot be rejected for any attribute in the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-sample. HB0 however is rejected for NS (at the 5 percent level) 
in the Sydney sub-sample.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 There are no significant differences in any of the attributes’ MWTP between the CL and RPL model without the panel specification.  
11 A significant difference (at the 10 percent level) was observed for NV in RPL model.   38
 
 
10. Conclusion   
 
Due to increasing interest in non-market valuation and its reliability, a lot of work has 
been devoted to finding mechanisms that give stated preference respondents incentives to 
reveal their true preferences (Dasgupta et al., 1979). The design of a multiple choice 
format CM study that avoids strategic behaviour has proven particularly difficult because 
of the multiple choices included and difficulties in developing a majority voting provision 
rule.  
 
The tests for IC in CM have been investigated in just a few non-market valuation 
laboratory experiments. This study investigates the impact of including a provision rule 
aimed at improving the IC of a field survey choice modelling study.  The test was 
conducted by investigating the impact of a provision rule on the stated preferences for a 
common catchment management strategy of two different communities (local/rural and 
distant/urban). Careful design of the survey and large sample sizes were additional steps 
undertaken to improve IC.  
 
The test for equivalence between parameters from the two sub-samples (with and without 
a provision rule) showed that there were significant (at the 5% level) differences between 
the parameters of the two data sets (PR and NPR) in the Sydney sub-samples. This 
indicates that the inclusion of a provision rule had an impact on respondent preferences. 
However, the lower scale parameter for the Sydney sub-sample with a provision rule 
indicates that choice behaviours are more random when a provision rule is used. On the 
other hand, in the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples, significant (at the 5% level) 
differences were observed in the variances but not in the actual coefficients. However, in 
this case a higher scale parameter for the sub-samples with a provision rule indicates a 
reduction in variance. Therefore there is a lack of consistency in the response to the 
provision rule across the two sub-samples.  
 
Further results showed that the WTP estimates for the questionnaires with and without a 
provision rule were not significantly different for the Hawkesbury-Nepean sub-samples.   39
 
 
However a significant difference (at the 10 percent level) between the Sydney sub-
samples (PR and NPR) was observed for the NS attributes and for NV in the RPL model. 
The values for this attributes were significantly higher (at 10 percent level) when the 
provision rule was not included in the questionnaire. In other words the inclusion of a 
provision rule reduced WTP estimates of respondents in Sydney only for NS and NV  
attribute.  
 
These results suggest that the inclusion of a provision rule in the local sub-sample had a 
negligible effect on the results of the CM study. However, the provision rule had a 
significant (at 10 percent level) effect on NS and NV attributes in the distant/urban 
community sub-sample. This implies that the distant/urban community was more 
sensitive to the inclusion of a provision rule than the local/rural community sub-sample. 
Hence, the local/rural community sub-sample with its closer association with the 
environment under consideration valued the change consistently across the two 
treatments. The distant urban communities’ values for the changes in NRM in the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment where a provision rule was included were significantly 
(at the 10 percent level) lower than the values obtained from the questionnaires without a 
provision rule. The impact of a provision rule should thus be analysed in the context of 
different community characteristics.  
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